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he trust of EU citizens in the EU’s single financial market was seriously undermined as a result of 
the financial crisis. Citizens suddenly realised that different levels and forms of depositor protection 
co-existed in the EU, whereas they had been told for almost 20 years that a single market was in 
place. Following the Northern Rock bank run in September 2007, it was clear that deposit protection 
systems in the EU did not function as they should. But it took European policy-makers another year to 
modify the 1994 Directive and drastically increase the level of deposit protection, in order to avoid a deep 
systemic crisis.  
Current deposit insurance arrangements in Europe need to be changed, as they match neither market 
integration nor consumer expectations. But deposit insurance cannot be considered in isolation; it is part of 
the broader financial safety net and the crisis resolution tools for banks. Confronted with the question of 
what option should be taken to draw the right lessons from the crisis, practically the only option is an EU-
wide fund, but policy-makers are still hesitant. Any intermediate solution will maintain too many 
distortions and imperfections and will not provide a coherent response to current challenges. 
This policy brief starts with a review of current policy discussions on deposit insurance in the EU.
1 The 
second part looks at the role of deposit insurance as part of the (European) financial safety net. The 
following sections examine the Commission’s recent proposal to amend the EU Directive on deposit 
guarantee schemes (DGS), and what is missing from it. The three options for a European deposit guarantee 
scheme and their implications are assessed in the fifth part. The final section presents conclusions and 
recommendations. 
  
                                                      
1 Throughout the text, the terms “deposit guarantee” and “deposit insurance” are used interchangeably. While the EU directive 
refers to deposit guarantee schemes, we prefer the term “deposit insurance”, as such schemes have typical insurance 
characteristics: in theory, the insured institution should pay regular contributions that serve to protect depositors in case of 
failure. Those contributions may be calculated on a risk basis and are typically not refunded at the end of the contract. 
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1. Introduction  
Deposit insurance generally has two main functions: 
to protect consumers and to enhance the stability of 
financial markets. These two objectives are also stated 
in the European Directive 94/19/EC on deposit 
guarantee schemes, which aims at “increasing the 
stability of the banking system and protection for 
savers” (Council, 1994). The consumer protection 
argument is straightforward. Banking stability is 
supported by DGS fostering depositors' trust in 
financial markets and giving them less of an incentive 
to relocate their savings.  
Goodhart (2008) argues for a third rationale, namely 
that deposit insurance allows public authorities to shut 
down failed banks more easily: when social hardship 
is limited (because of consumer protection), the 
liquidation of an institution becomes politically more 
acceptable (see also Boyd et al., 2009). In support of 
this point is also the idea that the financial sector 
should bear the cost of collapsing banks, not the 
consumer or the taxpayer.  
The Directive on deposit guarantee schemes was 
adopted by the EU in 1994, following the resolution 
to establish a single market within the EU. Back then, 
the idea was to enhance the integration of retail 
banking by providing minimum standards for deposit 
protection. Yet, the level of harmonisation was too 
low. A multiplicity of deposit insurance schemes was 
maintained, with wide variations in coverage level, 
deposit/depositor eligibility, legal statute (private or 
public), governance, payout procedures and funding 
mechanisms.  
The wide variety of deposit guarantee schemes has 
not proven to be crisis-resilient. Large government 
interventions were necessary to deal with failing 
banks in order to restore depositors’ trust and stop 
bank runs, such as the Northern Rock one in the UK 
(2007) or Landsbanki in Iceland (2008). Several 
European deposit insurers were not prepared to deal 
with such extreme crisis situations and even less with 
the cross-border dimensions of them. 
Although the differences and flaws in European 
schemes were known and well-documented by the 
European Commission (see EC, 2006), no action was 
taken at EU level until the financial crisis hit. In July 
2010, the Commission presented its proposal to recast 
the 1994 Directive, moving towards more targeted 
harmonisation. The proposal is a response to the 
problems that arose during the crisis, and to the 
recommendations by the experts in the de Larosière 
report for further harmonisation of DGS (EC, 2009a). 
The report argues that depositors should enjoy the 
same level of deposit protection in all member states, 
as the existing variety of DGS is considered 
unsustainable and unreliable in times of crisis.
2  
But how should an efficient, reliable and sustainable 
(pan-)European system of deposit insurance be 
designed? The harmonisation approach may range 
from limited to maximum, from a network of national 
DGS to the creation of one single deposit insurance 
fund that applies to all EU-licensed credit institutions. 
The mandate of deposit insurers may be limited to the 
simple ‘pay box’ function or going further towards an 
active role in the restructuring and/or liquidation of 
financial institutions. Other aspects that may differ, 
depending on the design of DGS envisaged, are the 
scope of coverage, funding mechanisms or 
organisational structures (see Box 1).  
The Commission’s recent proposal essentially extends 
the 1994 Directive, further harmonising numerous 
aspects of deposit insurance. The proposal does not 
represent a system change, as in some aspects it 
maintains the diversity in national systems. However, 
industry has already started to lobby to lower the 
harmonisation requirements and to water down the 
Commission’s text. The three largest EU countries: 
the UK, France and Germany, have expressed their 
concerns about the legal basis of the proposal 
(interfering with national sovereignty) as well as 
about the content. 
We believe that the Commission’s proposal does not 
represent a sufficient response to the problems raised 
by the crisis. Aspects related to the governance of 
DGS, their role in financial stability and the cross-
border dimension have not been sufficiently 
addressed, leaving scope for regulatory arbitrage, 
competitive distortions and moral hazard. Further 
harmonisation is desirable to sustain an integrated 
financial market. 
                                                      
2 The report proposes: “Recommendation 14: Deposit 
Guarantee Schemes (DGS) in the EU should be harmonized 
and preferably be pre-funded by the private sector (in 
exceptional cases topped up by the State) and provide high, 
equal protection to all bank customers throughout the EU.” 
(EC, 2009-02). OPTIONS FOR REFORMING DEPOSIT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN THE EU | 3 
 
Box 1. Characteristics of deposit insurance 
The main aspects that vary in the set-up of deposit insurance schemes are the following: 
Explicit or implicit schemes: In explicit schemes, protection is formally set, as opposed to implicit schemes, where 
this is – by definition – not formally specified. Explicit protection typically has the positive effect that the financial 
burden of failed banks does not have to be borne by the taxpayer (or only in exceptional circumstances). For implicit 
schemes, no rules are spelled out regarding the degree of coverage, the eligibility of bank liabilities or the funding of 
guarantees (Basel Committee and International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2009). In the case of a bank 
experiencing difficulties under implicit schemes, the state would have to step in to provide depositor protection, but 
it could let the bank fail as well. A downside of implicit protection is that it reduces the incentives for monitoring the 
behaviour of banks and their riskiness (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006). 
Legal form: Deposit insurance schemes may be created as public or private entities. Public or private organisation 
has further implications for responsibility and accountability – lying either with the government or the industry; 
typically, banking associations.  
Voluntary or compulsory membership: Membership in DGS may be voluntary or compulsory. Deposit protection 
is only provided to banks participating in the scheme. 
Funding of schemes: Deposit insurance schemes may be funded ex ante, ex post or with elements of both. Ex ante 
schemes rely on the collection of regular contributions, which build a fund that is drawn upon in case of a member’s 
failure. Ex post financing implies that funds are pulled together by DGS participants in the event of a member’s 
collapse. General advantages of ex ante funding are continuous contributions from all types of members (also poorly 
managed banks) and the immediate availability of funds. Yet, such financing creates a moral hazard problem, and 
entry and exit barriers, as contributions are typically not reimbursed when banks leave the system. Ex post funding 
schemes may set incentives for closer monitoring of credit institutions. However, a major drawback is its pro-
cyclical dimension, as funds must be collected in times of economic/financial distress. 
Risk-based contributions: Contributions to DGS can be calculated based on the riskiness of credit institutions’ 
operations, measured, for instance, in relation to a bank’s capital structure, exposures or income and profitability 
profile (for more information see European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 2008). The advantage of risk-based 
contributions is that they create incentives for sound management; however the development of such systems 
requires more resources and thorough analysis.  
Coverage level: In the EU, the obligatory minimum level of protection was € 20,000 just before the crisis (1994 
directive), and was raised to €50,000 in October 2008, with a further increase to €100,000 by the end of 2010 
(Council, 2009). Non-EU currency deposits were excluded under the 1994 Directive, but are covered under the 
Commission’s 2010 proposal. 
Eligible depositors: DGS generally cover retail customers (natural persons), but may also cover legal persons. 
Financial institutions are typically excluded from coverage.  
Eligible deposits: Cover is generally provided for the current account, savings deposits and other transaction 
accounts. It does not include investments such as bonds or securities. Deposits are generally covered per depositor 
per financial institution. 
Pay-out delays: The time lag before depositors are reimbursed generally depends on two events: (1) authorities’ 
determination of deposits’ unavailability and (2) the final payout of claims.  
Co-insurance: Co-insurance makes the depositors partially responsible for protection. For example, if the coverage 
limit is set at €40,000 and co-insurance at 10%, the depositor receives a payout of maximum €36,000. Co-insurance 
was the rule in the UK before Northern Rock filed for bankruptcy, but it was not applied when the bank failed. 
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2. Deposit insurance as part of the   
(European) financial safety net 
While the motivation for having deposit insurance 
tends to be the same across countries, DGS tasks, 
structures and their integration in the financial system 
are very different. Tasks may range from the basic 
‘pay box’ function to supervisory duties, providing 
liquidity, preventing failures or crisis management.  
The US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) is one example of a deposit insurer that carries 
out tasks well beyond the pay box function. Its 
mission is not only to protect deposits, but also to 
“examine and supervise financial institutions for 
safety and soundness and consumer protection, and 
manage receiverships”.
3 The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) therefore performs an 
active role in financial supervision and even bank 
resolution (Beck and Laeven, 2006).  
There seems to be a trend towards attributing more 
responsibilities to deposit insurance schemes and 
giving them more powers as well. They need to be 
equipped with the right tools to be able to effectively 
support stability in financial markets, not only during 
normal times, but under crisis situations as well. In 
the US, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 has indeed given 
the FDIC more responsibility in bank examination 
and resolution processes, for instance by transferring 
receivership authority over failing institutions to the 
FDIC. In Europe, DGS mostly have much less 
financial safety net functions. 
It has been widely accepted that deposit insurance is a 
core component of the financial safety net, along with 
prudential regulation and supervision, lender of last 
resort and bank failure resolution mechanisms. A 
financial safety net aims at promoting and 
maintaining safety and stability in financial markets. 
In the best-case scenario, prudential regulation and 
supervision are sufficient for ensuring stable markets. 
However, in the event of mounting uncertainty or 
crisis, the other mechanisms of the safety net come 
into play as well. 
Before the crisis, only a minimal part of the safety net 
was actually organised at EU level, namely the 
regulation of financial services providers. EU 
initiatives for regulating financial services are 
generally motivated by the objective of creating and 
enabling the single market. The other elements of the 
financial safety net (financial supervision, lender of 
last resort, resolution mechanisms and deposit 
insurance) remained largely national. This changed 
dramatically with the crisis: the lender of last resort 
                                                      
3 For more information, visit the FDIC’s website: 
http://www.fdic.gov. 
function has partly been taken up by the European 
Central Bank; financial supervision has been 
integrated into a European System of Financial 
Supervisors; and a discussion has opened up on 
European resolution mechanisms. As is the case for 
the other elements of the financial safety net, deposit 
insurance arrangements call for a European approach 
as well. 
DGS need to have an adequate supervisory role to 
allow efficient deposit protection. They should have 
access to supervisory information and be constantly 
informed about their members’ financial standing, as 
they are one of the first mechanisms to take action in 
the case of a failing bank. Academic research has 
shown that bank stability is better in countries where 
deposit insurers have supervisory powers and have the 
facility to intervene in failing banks (Beck and 
Laeven, 2006).  
In addition to supervisory tasks, other roles may be 
attributed to DGS in crisis management, for instance 
the provision of single point-of-contact services 
between depositors and banks and the coordination of 
reimbursement procedures.
4 The coordinating 
function is an important value-added in the case of 
cross-border institutions, where several deposit 
insurance schemes and other stakeholders are 
involved. 
Deposit insurance schemes could also be mandated to 
act preventively, for instance by providing liquidity to 
credit institutions in certain circumstances. In times of 
crisis, banks are confronted with illiquidity on the 
asset (market drain) and liability side (withdrawal of 
deposits) (Furceri and Mourougane, 2009), which is 
why governments have increasingly decided to 
implement a broader safety net (Garcia, 1999). DGS 
can intervene before the extreme case of a bank’s 
failure and maintain a bank’s activities. Such 
assignments are, however, risky and require strong 
monitoring. It would need to be assured that the DGS 
primarily continues to serve its main purpose: that of 
paying out depositors. In this context, the crucial 
difference between deposit insurance and other bank 
rescue measures is that DGS serve mainly depositors' 
interests, while general crisis management measures 
serve all creditors' and other stakeholders' interests.  
A financial safety net should form a coherent and 
efficient network, yet it is difficult to design, as the 
inclusion of different safeguard components may lead 
to conflicts of interest within the net. Supervisory 
authorities and policy-makers may be keen to keep a 
failing bank alive as long as possible for political 
reasons and in order to maintain financial stability. 
Deposit insurers on the other hand are likely to be in 
                                                      
4 Those two tasks were proposed in the Commission’s 
recast of the DGS Directive in July 2010. OPTIONS FOR REFORMING DEPOSIT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN THE EU | 5 
favour of a rapid closure of failing institutions before 
the situation worsens and losses increase.  
Such conflicting interests are inherent in financial 
safety nets and are difficult to resolve. A close 
cooperation between the different net components is 
therefore very important. To alleviate the problem, the 
responsibilities and powers of all participating entities 
need to be clearly defined. Beck (2003) suggests that 
a stronger inclusion of the industry in the financial 
safety net could minimise the dilemma, because 
“embedding the financial safety net and its different 
components in the banking community can reduce 
principal-agent problems by making banks the 
managers and owners of the safety net.” (Beck, 2003, 
p. 24). 
3. The Commission’s July 2010 proposal  
The consensus to review the 1994 Directive emerged 
during the financial crisis, although the many flaws of 
this measure were well recognised before then. The 
EU initially increased the level of protection in the 
midst of the crisis, announcing that it would come 
forward with a more far-reaching proposal at a later 
stage. This section reviews the different aspects of the 
Commission’s proposal, as proposed in July 2010.  
Compulsory membership 
Compulsory membership in deposit insurance implies 
that all depositors of credit institutions are protected 
and any bank failure will be covered by a scheme. 
The latter point is important in order to ensure that the 
cost of collapsing credit institutions is borne by the 
industry that contributes to the fund. Under the 1994 
Directive, participation in deposit insurance was not 
absolutely obligatory for credit institutions, as certain 
banks were allowed to be exempted if they were part 
of an alternative protection system. The Commission 
now proposes to eliminate any exception and to make 
membership fully compulsory. Such obligation is 
surely desirable as it establishes consistent coverage 
across credit institutions. 
Scope of coverage 
In past years, the coverage levels of national deposit 
insurance have varied widely within the EU (see 
Figure 1). The 1994 directive fixed the minimum 
coverage at €20,000 with the possibility of unlimited 
coverage, which maintained differences in  coverage 
levels, for instance ranging from €14,481 in Latvia to 
€103,291 in Italy in 2005 (EC, 2006). These 
differences in protection were well known, and were 
raised in a public consultation in 2006 (EC, 2006). 
But the Commission’s reaction at that time was 
somewhat elliptical. It only stated that amendments to 
coverage level would be considered in the longer 
term, and that no immediate action was necessary. 
This attitude changed dramatically under crisis 
circumstances, when two years later, in October 2008, 
the coverage was increased with immediate effect by 
the EU Council (without awaiting a Commission 
proposal) to €50,000. It was later formally increased 
to €100,000 from end 2010 onwards (EC, 2008). 
Figure 1. Payout limits and level of coverage in  
EU member states and Norway (2008) 
 
Note: Amounts as of 01.01.2008. ‘Payout limits’ may differ 
from the level of coverage for those countries where 
DGS apply co-insurance (see Box 1). 
Source: European Commission’s Joint Research Centre 
(JRC, 2008) 
 
The 2010 proposal confirms the coverage of 
€100,000, but this time as a maximum amount. The 
word ‘at least’ is dropped in the re-cast proposal (Art. 
5), which means that on this element, the draft follows 
the maximum harmonisation approach. The deposit 
guarantee needs to be high for psychological and 
political reasons, to calm depositors and to show 
commitment. With a coverage of €100,000, 
approximately 90% of EU deposits are expected to be 
protected. But, by limiting the coverage to 100,000, 
the draft limits distortions related to the so-called 
‘unlimited coverage’ DGS.  
With the uniform coverage of €100,000, topping-up 
arrangements that were possible under the 1994 
Directive are no longer necessary. The 1994 Directive 
allowed for branches to ‘top up’ their deposit 
protection in case they operated in a host country 
where the DGS provided for higher protection than 
under the home scheme. The idea was to exclude 
competitive disadvantages related to differing deposit 
protection coverage levels. At the same time, the non-
export provision of the 1994 Directive forbidding 
countries with higher protection countries to export 
their coverage levels could be dropped as well. 6 | GERHARDT & LANNOO 
Another point omitted from the 1994 Directive is co-
insurance, under which the depositors could be held 
partially responsible for protection (see Box 1). 
Supervision 
The Commission proposes to establish supervision of 
DGS and to carry out regular stress tests on their 
ability to handle claims. While this is a step in the 
right direction, the point is not elaborated sufficiently. 
The details of such supervision as well as the data on 
which stress tests should be based are left to the 
member states; no European approach or standard is 
being proposed. It is questionable to what extent the 
strength of those tests or supervisory information may 
be comparable or are actually meaningful.  
According to the Commission text, member states 
shall ensure that deposit insurers receive sufficient 
information from member banks to prepare 
reimbursement of depositors. Any details on how 
such communication between banks and DGS should 
take place are not specified in the proposal. For the 
sake of simplicity, especially in the context of cross-
border DGS cooperation, it would be advisable to 
have guidelines for this type of communication. After 
all, credit institutions’ motivation to voluntarily 
communicate financial difficulties to deposit insurers 
may be limited – information about a bank failure is 
typically not passed on until the very last moment. As 
argued above, deposit insurers absolutely need to 
have access to adequate (supervisory) information to 
maintain their schemes and enable fast payout. 
Table 1. Comparing the 1994 Directive with the 2010 Commission proposal 
  1994 Directive  2010 Commission’s proposal 
Participation in DGS  Possibility to exempt an institution if it is part 
of an alternative deposit protection system 
Compulsory for all deposit-taking institutions, 
without exception 
Coverage level  Minimum €20,000; possibility of unlimited 
coverage 
Maximum €100,000; unlimited coverage not 
possible  
Topping up  Possible  No; coverage should be the same 
Co-insurance  Allowed up to 10% of the  covered amount  No 
Eligibility: depositors  Exclusion of deposits by insurance 
undertakings, financial institutions, authorities, 
collective investment undertakings, pension 
funds, etc. 
All private individuals and non-financial 
enterprises, excluding authorities and financial 
institutions 
Eligibility: deposits  Only EU-currencies  All currencies; only fully repayable instruments, 
no certificates or bonds 
Payout delays  21 days for the authorities’ determination of 
unavailability of deposits; 3 months for payout, 
possible extension to 9 months 
5 days for the authorities’ determination of 
unavailability of deposits; one week for payout 
Financing  (not addressed)  75% ex ante fund and 25% ex post collection 
Contributions  (not addressed)  Risk-based contributions 
Fund size  (not addressed)  Target level of 1.5% of eligible deposits 
Depositor information  Presentation of information  Countersignature of "Depositor information 
template" required 
Borrowing 
arrangements 
(not addressed)  Access to funds from other DGS (also across 
borders) 
Home/host country 
schemes 
Subsidiaries participate in host scheme, 
branches in home scheme with possibility to 
top up 
Subsidiaries participate in host scheme, branches 
in home scheme; topping up not necessary with 
standardised scope of coverage.  
Further cooperation between DGS fostered. 
Local DGS serve as single point-of-contact to 
depositors, providing direct reimbursement 
Reporting and 
inquiries 
(not addressed)  Reporting to EBA on a monthly basis 
Procedural stages for 
payout 
(not addressed)  (not addressed) 
Precise definition of 
triggering event 
(not addressed)  (not addressed) 
Governance/ 
management 
(not addressed)  (not addressed) 
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Eligibility criteria and payout 
The Commission proposes to further harmonise 
eligibility criteria, basically extending coverage to all 
individuals and non-financial companies, and 
excluding authorities and financial institutions of any 
kind. Compared to the 1994 Directive, the coverage is 
extended to deposits in all currencies, EU as well as 
non-EU currencies. 
In order to ensure that depositors are reimbursed 
quickly, the Commission proposes to reduce the time 
delay for payout to one week. The 1994 Directive 
envisaged a reimbursement period of three months 
with a possible extension to nine, which had already 
been amended to 20 working days in 2009. This 
reduction is important as shorter delays reduce 
corrosion depositors’ trust. Several representatives of 
DGS have argued that the payout delay of seven days 
would be very difficult to meet, as the procedural 
steps needed more time. By comparison, in the US, 
reimbursement is possible even faster: in one day. 
However, as mentioned above, the US deposit insurer 
is much more integrated into the financial safety net 
and has access to more information.  
One element of the proposal that appears to be rather 
difficult to implement – especially for cross-border 
claims – is the reimbursement of depositors without a 
previous request. Such a procedure implies that 
depositors are being paid out without having to 
submit an application. In the case of branches 
operating in foreign countries, the host scheme would 
directly start the reimbursement, even though the 
home country would actually be responsible. Hence, 
the host scheme would pay out without depositors’ 
previous request, but at the same time probably only 
having limited access to information on the failing 
institution, as most data are held by the home scheme. 
DGS financing provisions 
The financing mechanism of DGS is of high 
significance in assuring the adequate funding and 
credibility of the scheme. Under the 1994 Directive, 
the funding of EU DGS is not harmonised and may 
either be ex ante, ex post or a combination of both. 
Past research has shown that national deposit 
guarantee schemes are not equally able to bear similar 
bank failures (EC, 2008). The Commission’s Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) collected data from all DGS in 
the EU to examine the ability to handle payouts (JRC, 
2008). It revealed that the coverage ratio
5 in most 
countries is not even sufficient to protect 1% of 
eligible deposits (see Table 2).  
                                                      
5 Coverage ratio = fund size (2005) / total amount of 
eligible deposits (2005). 
Table 2. Coverage ratio of EU DGS ranked by 
decreasing coverage ratio 
EU-15  Coverage 
ratio (%) 
New 
Member 
States 
Coverage 
ratio (%) 
SE  1.44  LT  2.30 
PT  0.99  BG  1.58 
ES  0.82  EE  1.54 
GR  0.58  RO  1.19 
FI  0.47  HU  0.62 
DK  (*)0.37  LV  0.58 
BE  0.33  PL  0.38 
IE  (*)0.19  CZ  0.31 
FR  0.14  MT  0.05 
UK
20 0.001  CY  (*)0.02 
    SK  -0.72 
NO  1.63    
Source: European Commission’s Joint Research Centre  
(JRC, 2008). The report is based on own survey data. 
Notes taken from the report:  
(*) Data on eligible deposits estimated from the dataset.  
(20) Though classified as an ex post scheme, the UK has a 
residual fund, a legacy from the previous system. 
Coverage ratios in the new member states tend to be 
higher, as those countries had to increase coverage to 
the EU €20,000 minimum standard when joining the 
EU. Since the average size of savings tends to be 
lower, the coverage ratio is comparatively high in the 
new member states: the average coverage ratio is 
0.86%, which compares to 0.53% in the EU-15 
countries (0.59% when the UK is excluded).
6 
In the same report, the JRC carried out a ‘stress-
testing’ exercise, which confirmed the weaknesses of 
EU DGS to handle payouts. Three different scenarios 
were tested, taking into account the availability of 
funding (ex ante, ex post and borrowing of funds): 
•  Small-impact scenario: €100 million average 
financial burden   
•  Medium-impact scenario: €2.18 billion average 
financial burden 
•  High-impact scenarios: €8.69 billion average 
financial burden 
Results showed that all EU DGS could cover a small-
impact bank failure. A medium-sized failure could be 
borne by seven EU countries with the highest 
coverage ratios using only ex ante funds. Six member 
states would not be able to reimburse depositor claims 
in the medium-impact case, even if they used all 
available funding, including ex post funds and 
additional borrowing. No member state was well-
equipped to cope with a large failure using only ex 
ante funds. 
                                                      
6 Several countries have not been included in part of the 
calculations because of a lack of or insufficient data being 
provided; Germany, for instance. 8 | GERHARDT & LANNOO 
At first glance, the amounts used above for the third 
scenario seem to be large. However, they are very 
realistic when considering the sums of deposits that 
were suddenly at risk during the financial crisis. 
When the relatively small UK bank Northern Rock 
applied for emergency funding in 2007, depositors 
withdrew more than £2 billion (ca. €3 billion) in 
under a week (BBC, 2007a). The total of customer 
deposits at Northern Rock amounted to around £24 
billion (BBC, 2007b), therefore exceeding the ‘high-
impact scenario’ by far. The consequence of the bank 
run was that the UK government decided to step in 
and provide a full guarantee to Northern Bank 
depositors. 
The Commission's proposal introduces harmonised 
financing mechanisms of national DGS and a target 
level of 1.5% of eligible deposits ex ante. In case ex 
ante funds are insufficient to reimburse depositors in 
the event of bank failure, banks are obliged to 
contribute up to 0.5% of eligible deposits to finance 
the DGS. The Commission's proposal therefore 
envisages a combination of ex ante and ex post 
financing, which is desirable as it keeps the 
advantageous aspects of both: ex ante funding is 
considered more credible, flexible and not pro-
cyclical, while ex post contributions provide for 
monitoring incentives amongst financial market 
participants.  
To reach a fund size of 1.5% of eligible deposits, the 
Commission suggests a transition period of ten years, 
until the end of 2020. This transition period is long, 
but should be considered in combination with other 
regulatory changes. Attention needs to be dedicated to 
the compound impact of new regulations, such as 
minimum liquidity requirements in Basel III, 
contributions to a bank resolution fund, and new 
deposit insurance arrangements have on banks. 
In the event that the first two funding mechanisms (ex 
ante and ex post funding) are not sufficient for a 
payout, the Commission proposes to establish a 
mutual borrowing facility. Such facility allows 
national DGS to borrow from all other deposit 
insurance schemes in the EU under certain conditions. 
As a fourth financing mechanism of DGS, the 
Commission requires deposit insurers to have in place 
'alternative funding arrangements'. But further 
information on such arrangements is not given, 
neither are details on what form they could possibly 
take. 
Risk-based contributions and the use of funds 
The Commission proposes contributions that include 
non-risk and risk-based elements. The non-risk part is 
calculated on the level of deposits eligible for 
insurance. The risk-based element depends on the risk 
profile of credit institutions, such as their risk 
exposure, capital structure and income profile.  
Risk-based contributions are recommended as they 
create incentives for sound management and 
discourage risky engagements. A further argument for 
risk-based contributions is that they introduce some 
component of fairness to financing structures, because 
riskier businesses have to pay higher contributions. It 
is therefore of utmost importance to have well-
designed contribution mechanisms, as deficient 
calculations would result in the opposite, namely 
unfair financing structures. The risk-based calculation 
therefore has to fully take account of different 
business models of banks to be efficient and provide 
the right incentives.  
According to the Commission’s proposal, the DGS 
funds shall mainly be used to pay out depositors’ 
claims. Member states may allow deposit insurers to 
dedicate established funds to other measures to avoid 
bank failures. That may be permitted only when funds 
are sufficiently large, 1% of eligible deposits has to 
remain on the DGS after the intervention. The precise 
regulation regarding the use of funds is left to member 
states’ judgement. It can be argued that it might be in 
depositors' interests to use part of the funds for pre-
emptive actions in order to avoid bank failure. 
However, if this is done it should always be ensured 
that the use of the funds does not imply any reduction 
in depositor protection. 
Another aspect regarding the fund size is how funds 
should be used once the balance exceeds the 1.5% 
target level. The Commission does not address this 
point in its proposal. In the US, the FDIC provides 
dividends to its contributing institutions in case the 
fund level is above the target. For Europe, this point is 
again left to member states.   
Cross-border activities of banks and DGS  
The appropriate coverage of subsidiaries as compared 
to branches emerged as a major issue in the crisis, but 
the Commission’s proposal does not address this 
problem at all. Instead, it holds on to the current 
branch/subsidiary and home/host country distinction. 
The 1994 Directive stipulated that in the case of 
cross-border activities through branches, the 
competent DGS is the one in which the head office is 
located. Therefore, subsidiaries – being separate legal 
entities – participate in the deposit insurance schemes 
of the country of incorporation, while branches – 
which are not separately incorporated – are covered 
by the home-country deposit insurance scheme. The 
approach of subsidiary/branch participation in 
host/home country DGS is in general consistent with 
the supervisory responsibility of financial authorities, 
however it leaves shortcomings in practice. While 
branches should be covered by their home country 
DGS, the crisis has shown that in several cases host 
countries had to step in as the home deposit insurer 
was not in a position to honour its obligations (see OPTIONS FOR REFORMING DEPOSIT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN THE EU | 9 
Box 2). If branches (i.e. the parent company) face 
financial difficulties, the host country has reason to 
intervene in order to protect consumers and avoid any 
spill-over effects from the bank failure. Such 
intervention represents a de facto shift of 
responsibility from the home- to the host-country, the 
latter actually not having supervisory responsibility.  
The EU DGS regulation for branches/subsidiaries was 
criticized several years before the crisis by Eisenbeis 
(2004), who stated that the current approach 
“bifurcates the responsibilities for controlling banking 
risk between the micro-risk associated with the 
operation of single institutions from the macro-risk 
associated with contagion risk or risk that spreads 
from one institution to another regardless of where the 
institutions are headquartered”. He strongly argued in 
favour of a harmonised system of deposit insurance 
within the EU, and warned that the decentralised DGS 
would not be robust enough to face a financial crisis, 
because it would be exposed to several conflicts of 
interest and regulatory competition (see also Garcia, 
1999).  
The home-host responsibility represents a serious 
challenge to the integration of the single market, 
concerning supervision as well as deposit insurance. 
With larger shares of savings being deposited abroad, 
as well as more foreign branch activity, the incentive 
for domestic supervisors or national deposit insurers 
to intervene decreases. Where there are emerging 
financial difficulties, this problem rapidly turns into a 
supra-national challenge that needs a supra-national 
response. 
Further cross-border challenges are raised in the 
Commission proposal as it calls for enhanced 
cooperation between deposit insurers. It foresees, for 
instance, the establishment of a system of single point 
of contact for customers. This implies that if a bank 
with cross-border operations fails, branch customers 
from abroad (who are covered by the bank’s home 
country scheme) do not have to contact several DGS, 
but simply their national deposit insurer. That insurer 
serves as the sole point of reference and should 
directly reimburse the depositors on behalf of the 
DGS that is actually responsible (in the home 
country). The home scheme will then refund the host 
country insurer at a later stage.  
 
Box 2. The case of Iceland  
The meltdown of the Icelandic banking system is a good illustration of the weaknesses of the current EU DGS 
Directive. Shortly before the crisis, the Central Bank of Iceland set the interest rates above 15%, which led to strong 
capital inflows from abroad and encouraged Icelanders to borrow in other currencies. These trends, combined with 
exchange rate appreciation, resulted in a bubble that burst in late 2008.  
At the beginning of October 2008, the three largest Icelandic banks (Landsbanki, Glitnir and Kaupthing) collapsed 
within one week and the government had to step in to take control. Many foreign depositors with savings in accounts 
of Icelandic branches abroad saw their deposits frozen. Following the collapse, the UK decided to intervene and use 
the British anti-terrorism act to seize the assets of Landsbanki in Britain. This move outraged the Icelandic 
government, as it felt that it was suddenly classed as a ‘terrorist’ state. 
The branch structure of Icelandic banks’ activities in mainland Europe implied that the home-country DGS was 
responsible, as stated in deposit contracts; in this case the Icelandic Depositors’ and Investors’ Guarantee Fund 
(DIGF). The DIGF is a private foundation and therefore not necessarily bailed out by its government. Yet, political 
pressures from abroad were such that the Icelandic government promised to repay the UK and the Netherlands (June 
2009) – both countries had fully compensated depositors with accounts at Landsbanki, with the aim to recover the 
amounts from Iceland at a later stage. However, the compensation was turned down by the Icelandic population in a 
national referendum in March 2010. Almost a year later, in February 2011, the Icelandic Parliament finally approved a 
new agreement to repay €4bn to the UK and the Netherlands. However, this deal is not yet sealed, as there are chances 
that the repayment might be blocked once more as another referendum is scheduled for April 2011.  
The case of Iceland illustrates numerous weaknesses of the 1994 Directive. Since Iceland is a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), it must comply with the requirements laid down in the DGS Directive. Icelandic banks were 
maintaining branch and subsidiary structures in continental Europe providing financial services, where the branch 
structures were not adequately backed up by the DIGF. The Kaupthing bank for instance maintained subsidiaries in 
Finland and Luxemburg, which then again served other countries. In 2008/09, those subsidiaries had to ask for state 
aid from Finland and Luxemburg in order to reimburse depositors in Finland and Belgium (from Luxemburg) (EC, 
2009d and EC, 2009e). The number of supervisors in charge evidently complicated the task.  
The legal framework stipulates that the Icelandic DGS should have covered the branch activity in other EEA member 
states. Yet, the collapse of the Icelandic banking system shifted the responsibility de facto from the home to the host 
country. The UK and the Netherlands were under political pressure to act and calm depositors' worries. This situation 
is not sufficiently addressed in the new Commission proposal. 
Note: This section is based on information from the Central Bank of Iceland, Reuters, (www.iceland.org) and  
the Turner Review (FSA, 2009).  10 | GERHARDT & LANNOO 
 
This cross-border cooperation should not be difficult 
to impose in theory; several challenges remain in 
practice, however. If host schemes advance the 
reimbursement, they evidently run the risk of not 
being reimbursed by the home country DGS. This 
may appear unlikely in a network of cooperating 
deposit insurers, yet this is exactly what happened in 
the case of Iceland, where UK and Dutch depositors 
were paid out by national schemes in 2008. The UK 
and the Netherlands are still waiting for 
reimbursement two years later, although a settlement 
is in the making (see Box 2 above). 
Moreover, is it questionable whether the exchange of 
information between different European schemes will 
make for successful collaboration. The Commission 
proposes that member states shall ensure that deposit 
insurers exchange information, but no details have 
been given on how this should take place. If home 
schemes pay out depositors on behalf of the home 
scheme, they need to have access to all information 
relevant for reimbursement. The information 
evidently needs to be accessible to DGS rapidly in 
order to stay within the one-week payout period. If 
the exchange of information remains non-standardised 
across Europe, important obstacles to cross-border 
cooperation remain. Guidelines on standardised 
information exchange and procedures would be 
helpful.  
Depositor information  
The 1994 Directive simply required the presentation 
of information on the protecting DGS to customers. 
The Commission now proposes to make it 
compulsory to have depositors countersign the 
"Depositor information template" to ensure that 
customers are fully aware of the existence of deposit 
protection. It is important that customers entirely 
understand deposit insurance, as this knowledge may 
avoid bank runs, because depositors know their 
savings are protected. It is also necessary to increase 
general public awareness of deposit insurance and the 
existence of such schemes that protect depositors in 
order to prevent bank runs. 
The new supervisory architecture 
Deposit insurance is an essential element of the 
financial safety net, along with prudential regulation, 
ongoing supervision and other mechanisms. It is 
therefore highly important to include DGS in the 
ongoing process of redesign of the financial 
supervisory architecture in Europe. In the 
Commission’s proposal, this is only done to a very 
limited extent, basically including the newly created 
European Banking Authority (EBA) in a few 
processes. 
The Commission proposes the following tasks for the 
EBA with respect to deposit insurance: to collect 
statistical data on eligible/covered deposits and 
available financial means, to conduct peer reviews, to 
confirm borrowing arrangements between DGS and 
settle any disagreements that may arise between 
deposit insurers. A further elaboration of coordination 
between supervisory authorities and deposit insurance 
is missing. 
In order to have a coherent approach to financial 
stability, deposit insurance schemes need to be 
included in the ongoing restructuring process of 
financial supervision in the EU. DGS should be 
attributed a clear role in the stability framework; 
reporting requirements to the EBA are not sufficient. 
Potential roles of deposit insurance in financial 
supervision or crisis prevention and management need 
to be considered.  
4. Not considered in the Commission’s 
proposal 
Several key aspects and challenges of European 
deposit insurance have not been appropriately dealt 
with in the Commission’s proposal. An important 
point is surely the problem of branch/subsidiary 
structure and the related liabilities, as mentioned 
above. A continuation of the existing home/host 
country division of responsibilities simply does not 
solve the problem. Other open issues are the legal 
structure and governance, payout procedures and the 
triggering event. A separate section is dedicated to the 
key question on a pan-European structure.  
Legal structure and governance  
The legal structure and governance of DGS differ 
throughout member states, being created and 
administered either as a public or private entity. This 
has important implications for the liabilities of the 
fund, in case it needed to be called upon or extra 
funding was necessary. In theory, governments should 
only be held responsible for reimbursement in case of 
a public fund scheme and the private sector should be 
liable for the private DGS. However, if the private 
sector cannot honour its obligations, governments 
face strong pressures to rescue and protect (part of) 
those that hold stakes in failed banks, especially 
private individuals (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006). As 
has been seen in the past, it is unavoidable that 
governments are required to take action to protect 
depositors.
7 This government role persists, no matter 
whether the fund is public or private, or whether the 
responsibility is explicit or implicit. 
                                                      
7 The practice of governments issuing blanket guarantees to 
limit depositors’ fears is not a new one; this approach has 
been taken in the past, for instance during the Swedish 
crisis in 1992, before Sweden adopted an explicit DGS in 
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Based on past experience, the question of DGS 
governance and legal structure (public or private) 
needs attention and discussion. Is it advisable to have 
schemes in private or private hands? It appears that a 
private organisation is not necessarily efficient, as the 
ultimate responsibility is always likely to fall back on 
governments. 
Payout procedures and triggering events 
When it comes to reimbursement procedures, the 
Commission simply proposes the reduction in the 
number of days before payout. The variety in payout 
procedures of European schemes is not addressed, 
even though they tend to be very different. Research 
has shown that payout procedures at European deposit 
insurers can consist of up to 21 stages involving 
numerous different entities (JRC, 2008). The variety 
of procedures and competencies hampers the 
communication between deposit insurers across 
borders, even more so as different types of entity may 
be involved during these phases.  
The ‘triggering event’ that leads to initialising the 
reimbursement procedure has not been clearly defined 
in the past, neither does the Commission propose a 
specification now. The JRC report (2008), illustrates 
that the triggering event falls within the responsibility 
of up to eight different types of entities, with no 
harmonisation across European countries. This is 
evidently not conducive to handling cross-border 
cases. It would be advisable to define clear criteria for 
when and how payout processes should be initialised. 
Beck and Laeven (2006) argue that it would be 
desirable to involve the owners of the fund or banking 
authorities in the decision of unavailability of funds as 
they are likely to be more efficient than courts, 
because they “better understand bank risk-taking 
incentives and how to remedy them”.  
Both issues – differences in payout procedures and 
triggering events – should be more harmonised to 
allow for close cooperation between national DGS 
and to avoid panic.  
5. What pan-European structure for 
deposit insurance? 
For the time being, deposit insurance in the EU is 
organised at the national level, which is also the 
reason for the great variety in schemes. The 
Commission’s proposal does not change much of this 
organisation; it only introduces the idea of a 
strengthened network of national DGS. Given the 
EU’s major objective of integrating markets for 
financial services in order to achieve the single 
market, the question arises whether the maintenance 
of national structures is the adequate response to 
credit institutions that are increasingly operating 
across borders, certainly for those working through 
branches. 
In addition to the proposed network model of 
European deposit insurers, two further structures are 
conceivable, namely a 28
th regime and the creation of 
a single fund. The three options basically range from 
the cooperation/network approach to full 
harmonisation (a single fund). They could potentially 
be introduced successively, gradually moving towards 
complete integration. A gradual upgrading would 
however lead to high administrative costs. If the goal 
is to introduce full integration, it would be more 
reasonable to aim directly for the single European 
DGS instead of establishing a 28th regime.  
The first option (the network) could be implemented 
rapidly, if the political will is there. The network 
approach requires enhanced information-sharing 
among members and possibly the creation of inter-
fund reimbursement and lending facilities. The 
disadvantage is that it does not fully address the 
challenges the internal market is facing at the 
moment. With cross-border banks maintaining 
structures of branches and subsidiaries abroad, 
responsibility for coverage and reimbursement may 
be confusing. A variety of national deposit insurance 
schemes with complex banking structures renders 
reimbursement formalities extremely difficult.  
Under the second alternative – the 28
th regime – 
national schemes are kept and a pan-European deposit 
insurance is created as a complement. Such a scheme 
could take the form of a common fund, 
complementing national schemes and providing part 
of the deposit insurance or a system of re-insurance 
for cross-border banks. As is the case for option (1), 
this second option keeps current DGS structures and 
does not provide a single solution to current 
challenges. The problems with cross-border banks, as 
well as competitive concerns, remain. 
With the third option a newly-created single pan-
European fund would replace existing DGS, insuring 
deposits of all credit institutions established in the 
internal market. Such a single fund could deliver the 
solution to many challenges that the networks 
structure or 28
th regime cannot handle adequately. 
First of all, the important risk and responsibility issue 
for cross-border institutions would be solved, as all 
banks would adhere and contribute to the same DGS. 
That implies that the branch/subsidiary question 
would simply disappear. Furthermore, competitive 
distortions would be minimised as a single fund 
would create a level playing field for all deposit-
taking institutions. Any remaining differences in 
protection would be eliminated. Consumer protection 
would be harmonised and no disturbing cross-border 
differences would persist. In addition, the 
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considerably lower administrative costs than running 
separate national systems. Last but not least, a 
centrally located fund could easily take on additional 
tasks, such as observing/supervising risk-taking in the 
market, which would be of considerable value-added 
in the case of cross-border credit institutions. 
In addition to the risk/responsibility issue in European 
deposit protection, the three pan-European structures 
have different implications regarding regulatory 
arbitrage and competition. In general, the more 
fragmented structure with a network of national DGS 
may lead to higher levels of regulatory arbitrage. With 
varying deposit insurance schemes, banks have an 
incentive to take advantage of regulatory differences, 
for instance by operating in countries where 
participating in DGS comes with a lower financial 
burden. On the other hand, depositors have reason to 
benefit from arbitrage by locating their funds in 
countries with higher deposit insurance. These issues 
could be solved by one single DGS for all credit 
institutions in the EU.  
Moral hazard arises with any type of guarantee or 
insurance, but with the creation of a single pan-
European deposit insurance fund, that problem may 
be stronger as national supervisors may be less 
attentive to risk. They may feel less need to monitor 
their banks, as there would be a large fund accessible 
to bail them out. At the other end, credit institutions 
may be more prone to risk-taking for the same reason, 
meaning that the existence of a bulky fund to offer 
support in case of business failure would lead to 
banks adopting more risk-taking behaviour. The 
moral hazard concerns that are stronger with full 
integration would need to be addressed with clear 
control/supervisory arrangements, possibly with 
bolstered responsibilities and powers of deposit 
insurers regarding the monitoring of and inquiring 
about the health of credit institutions, and clear 
triggers. 
6. Conclusion and recommendations 
Sixteen years after the first EU legislation, the 
challenge to harmonise deposit protection schemes 
remains. During the crisis, a number of DGS proved 
unreliable and serious cross-border tensions emerged 
in handling payouts. As a result, increasing the 
efficiency of deposit protection schemes emerged as a 
policy priority. But to what extent should schemes be 
harmonised in the EU and what roles should they 
have?  
The Commission’s 2010 proposal is a first step 
forward, covering a number of aspects of DGS, such 
as the harmonisation of scope of coverage and 
deposit/depositor eligibility. This will increase 
consumer protection in many countries and limit 
incentives to locate savings in markets with higher 
coverage levels, as the same amounts and types of 
deposits will be insured throughout the EU. 
The proposed financing requirements and targeted 
fund size of deposit insurance are necessary, because 
past experience has demonstrated that the fund 
availability was not sufficient to handle consumers’ 
claims following bank failures. The target level of 
1.5% of eligible deposits appears reasonable, as 
experiences have been positive in the US with the 
FDIC target level at 1.15-1.5% of insured deposits. 
But it implies that several DGS have to change from 
ex post to ex ante funding and have to create 
considerable reserves. This comes at a high cost for 
credit institutions, in addition to the new standards for 
capital and liquidity requirements stemming from 
Basel III, and possibly other rules.  
While the Commission’s proposal certainly has its 
merits, a number of issues are left open, for example 
what further roles deposit insurers should take on. As 
argued above, there are strong reasons to equip 
deposit insurers with a mandate beyond the simple 
pay box function, and including them in the wider 
financial safety net. If that role was extended to 
intervention measures, European DGS would need to 
be equipped with adequate powers and tools. Such 
mandate would only make sense if banks’ resolution 
procedures were clearly aligned as well. DGS should 
be assigned a clear role in the European stability 
framework; limited reporting requirements to the 
EBA is not sufficient. And their role should be 
reconsidered now, as the regulatory response to the 
crisis should embrace the entire safety net in order to 
avoid any inconsistencies.  
An important omission in the Commission’s proposal 
is governance structures and the ultimate liability of 
private and public DGS. Would it be better to have a 
pan-European scheme administered by the public or 
private sector? For the time being, both governance 
structures exist at the national level. Yet, no matter 
how well a DGS is designed, there always remains an 
implicit responsibility on governments to step in as 
the lender of last resort, as was largely the case during 
the crisis. This ultimate liability of the public sector is 
a strong argument in favour of publicly administered 
pre-funded deposit insurance.  
Out of the three possible pan-European schemes 
discussed above, the only efficient, reliable and 
sustainable solution is full harmonisation, meaning 
the creation of a single European deposit insurance 
scheme. The network structure always leaves 
regulatory gaps, as does a 28
th regime. With full 
harmonisation, many challenges posed by the existing 
variety in national deposit insurance schemes would 
disappear, for instance related to the scope of 
coverage, payout procedures and – most important – 
the branch vs subsidiary treatment of foreign banks. OPTIONS FOR REFORMING DEPOSIT PROTECTION SCHEMES IN THE EU | 13 
For the time being, however, full harmonisation is 
difficult to enforce, as some member states and 
national interest groups are already manifesting their 
dissent over the Commission proposal. 
Pleas by national governments and interest groups 
that stronger harmonisation of deposit insurance is not 
in line with the subsidiarity principle can be 
disregarded, as DGS of a different nature cannot co-
exist in a single market and European action to 
address deposit insurance challenges is more effective 
than action taken at national or local level. The 
problems that have arisen to protect and reimburse 
depositors across borders call for more harmonisation, 
since a network approach is clearly insufficient.  
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